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A robust anomaly in intertemporal choice is the delay–speedup asymmetry: Receipts are discounted
more, and payments are discounted less, when delayed than when expedited over the same interval. We
developed 2 versions of the tradeoff model (Scholten & Read, 2010) to address such situations, in which
an outcome is expected at a given time but then its timing is changed. The outcome framing model
generalizes the approach taken by the hyperbolic discounting model (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992): Not
obtaining a positive outcome when expected is a worse than expected state, to which people are
over-responsive, or hypersensitive, and not incurring a negative outcome when expected is a better than
expected state, to which people are under-responsive, or hyposensitive. The time framing model takes a
new approach: Delaying a positive outcome or speeding up a negative one involves a loss of time to
which people are hypersensitive, and speeding up a positive outcome or delaying a negative one involves
a gain of time to which people are hyposensitive. We compare the models on their quantitative
predictions of indifference data from matching and preference data from choice. The time framing model
systematically outperforms the outcome framing model.
Keywords: intertemporal choice, discounting, delay–speedup asymmetry, outcome framing, time
framing
Intertemporal choices are choices between streams of outcomes
differing in value and timing. Psychologists have largely investigated
monetary intertemporal choices, such as one between $100 now and
$150 in 1 year. This is a decision of whether to accept or decline a
50% interest rate applied to $100 now, or, conversely, of whether to
accept or decline a 33% discount rate applied to $150 in 1 year.
Psychologists have discovered numerous anomalies to a rational-
choice analysis, in which the interest or discount rate implied by
choice is constant and equal to the decision maker’s opportunity cost
of money. For many people, this is the bank rate of interest or the
mortgage rate. However, people are influenced by many characteris-
tics of the choice task that are normatively irrelevant.
Every monetary transaction will involve receipts or payments. To
determine the interest rate, rational-choice analysis does not care
which. Yet, experimental investigations have revealed two robust
patterns in which receipts and payments are not treated in the same
way. One result, the gain–loss asymmetry (Loewenstein & Prelec,
1992) or the sign effect (Thaler, 1981), is a main effect of outcome
sign: People offer lower interest rates for payments than they demand
for receipts (Baker, Johnson, & Bickel, 2003; McAlvanah, 2010;
Murphy, Vuchinich, & Simpson, 2001; Xu, Liang, Wang, Li, &
Jiang, 2009; Yates & Watts, 1975). Consider the following two
choices between a smaller-sooner outcome (SS) and a larger-later one
(LL):
Receipts:
SS Receive $100 today.
LL Receive $150 in 1 year.
Payments:
SS Pay $100 today.
LL Pay $150 in 1 year.
Someone who is indifferent between SS and LL for receipts
(demanding a 50% interest rate) will typically prefer SS for pay-
ments (offering less than 50%). The other result, the delay–
speedup asymmetry (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992), is an interac-
tion effect between outcome sign and changes in outcome timing:
People demand higher interest rates for delayed receipts than they
offer for expedited ones (Appelt, Hardisty, & Weber, 2011; Ben-
zion, Rapoport, & Yagil, 1989; Loewenstein, 1988; Malkoc &
Zauberman, 2006; McAlvanah, 2010; Shelley, 1993; Weber et al.,
2007) and offer lower interest rates for delayed payments than they
demand for expedited ones (Appelt et al., 2011; Benzion et al.,
1989; McAlvanah, 2010; Shelley, 1993). Consider the following
pairs of choices for receipts and payments:
Receipts:
Delay:
You are entitled to receive $100 today. Choose between:
SS Receive $100 today, as planned.
LL Delay the receipt and receive $200 in 1 year instead.
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Speedup:
You are entitled to receive $200 in 1 year. Choose between:
SS Receive $200 in 1 year, as planned.
LL Speed up the receipt and receive $100 today instead.
Payments:
Delay:
You are obliged to pay $100 today. Choose between:
SS Pay $100 today, as planned.
LL Delay the payment and pay $120 in 1 year instead.
Speedup:
You are obliged to pay $120 in 1 year. Choose between:
SS Pay $120 in 1 year, as planned.
LL Speed up the payment and pay $100 today instead.
Someone who, for receipts, is indifferent between SS and LL in the
delay frame (demanding a 100% interest rate) will typically prefer
LL in the speedup frame (offering less than 100%). In a similar
vein, someone who, for payments, is indifferent between SS and
LL in the delay frame (offering a 20% interest rate) will typically
prefer LL in the speedup frame (demanding more than 20%).
“Because,” according to Loewenstein and Prelec (1992, p. 578),
“the two pairs of choices are actually different representations of
the same underlying options, the [preference patterns] constitute a
classic framing effect, which is inconsistent with any normative
theory.” In this article, we examine two alternative interpretations
of the delay–speedup asymmetry, one ascribing it to the framing of
outcomes, as is done in previous models (Loewenstein, 1988;
Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992; Shelley, 1993), and the other ascrib-
ing it to the framing of time.
The gain–loss and delay–speedup asymmetries, however, are
not the only anomalies to the normative interest-rate model. To
accommodate a broad range of anomalies, many of which are
also anomalous to “conventional” models like the discounted
utility model (P. A. Samuelson, 1937), the hyperbolic discount-
ing model (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992), and the quasi-
hyperbolic discounting model (Laibson, 1997), we developed
the tradeoff model (Scholten & Read, 2010). In this article, we
further develop the tradeoff model to arrive at quantitative
predictions of data that contain the gain–loss and delay–
speedup asymmetries along with three other anomalies. In par-
ticular, we develop two versions of the tradeoff model, one that
ascribes the delay–speedup asymmetry to outcome framing, and
the other that ascribes it to time framing. The time framing
model systematically outperforms the outcome framing model
in the prediction of indifference data from matching and pref-
erence data from choice.
We begin with the compound-interest model and the expo-
nential discounting model deriving from it, which will provide
the dependent variables in our analyses of indifference data
from matching. The exponential discounting model, along with
other discounting models to be specified later in this introduc-
tion, will serve as benchmarks to evaluate the predictive accu-
racy of the tradeoff models.
Compound Interest Rates
and Exponential Discount Rates
Let xS be the immediate outcome, and xL be the outcome that
is delayed by tL units of time, so that the smaller-sooner (SS)
outcome is (xS, 0) and the larger-later (LL) outcome is (xL, tL).
The interest-rate model posits that the person will be indifferent
between SS and LL when xL is the amount that xS would become
if increased by the interest over the period tL. Thus, when the
personal interest rate is r, we have:
xS(1 r)tL xL. (1)
In this model, the person demands compound interest, which is that
interest earned over xS also bears interest. To illustrate, someone
indifferent between $100 today and $150 in 1 year will also
be indifferent between $100 and $225 in 2 years. Solving Equation
1 for the per-period interest rate,
r xL
xS
1⁄tL 1. (2)
The compound-interest model describes present-to-future con-
version, but it may be changed so as to describe future-to-
present conversion instead, which is what the exponential dis-
counting model does:
xS
1
(1 r)tLxL
tLxL, (3)
where 0    1 is a per-period discount factor, which indicates the
proportion of the (discounted) value of xL that remains over one
period of time. To illustrate, if the person is indifferent between $100
today and $150 in 1 year, the proportion of the $150 receipt that
remains over a period of 1 year is 67%. Solving Equation 3 for the
per-period discount factor,
 xS
xL
1⁄tL. (4)
The per-period discount factor is inversely related to discounting:
Lower values indicate more discounting. Instead of looking at how
much remains over one period of time, one can look at how much
is lost over one period of time. This is what the per-period discount
rate does: It indicates the proportion of the value of xL that is lost
over one period of time:

r
1 r
 1,
where 0    1 is the per-period discount rate. To illustrate,
if the person is indifferent between $100 today and $150 in 1
year, the rate at which the $150 receipt is discounted is  
.50/(1  .50)  1 – .67  .33, that is, the proportion of its value
that is lost over one period of time is 33%. The per-period
discount rate is directly related to discounting, in that higher
values indicate more discounting.
The exponential discounting model posits that the personal
interest rate r, or the discount fraction  and discount rate  into
which the personal interest rate can be transformed, is constant.
However, the gain–loss and delay–speedup asymmetries show
that r varies. In the next section, we describe three other
anomalies to the exponential discounting model that will fea-
ture in our data.
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
1193TIME AND OUTCOME FRAMING
Anomalies to the Exponential Discounting Model
Two anomalies were described in the introduction:
1. The gain–loss asymmetry or the sign effect, and
2. the delay–speedup asymmetry.
In addition to these sign-related anomalies, we examine anomalies
related to the magnitude of the outcomes and the delay to the
outcomes, which are described below.
3. The absolute magnitude effect (Loewenstein & Prelec,
1992) or the size effect (see Thaler, 1981): People demand or
offer lower interest rates with large outcomes than with small
ones. For instance, someone indifferent between $100 today
and $150 in 1 year (50%) might also be indifferent between
$1,000 today and $1,250 in 1 year (25%). The absolute mag-
nitude effect is probably the most robust anomaly in intertem-
poral choice (Scholten & Read, 2010), and the most difficult
one to address with parametric specifications of discounting
models (Scholten & Read, 2012).
4. The delay effect (Thaler, 1981): People demand or offer
lower interest rates with long delays than with short ones. For
instance, someone indifferent between $100 today and $150 in
1 year (50% per annum) might also be indifferent between
$100 today and $200 in 2 years (41% per annum). The delay
effect is conventionally addressed by hyperbolic discounting
models.
Finally, while the delay–speedup asymmetry is an interaction
between outcome sign and changes in outcome timing, we also
examine its interaction with delay length. This anomaly has not
been identified earlier, but we infer it from one piece of avail-
able evidence.
5. An attenuation of the delay–speedup asymmetry for longer
delays. The evidence comes from Malkoc and Zauberman
(2006), who reported an interaction effect between the delay to
the larger outcome and changes in outcome timing: The delay
effect was stronger when delaying a receipt than when speeding
it up. A hypothetical reconstruction of their result is provided in
the top left panel of Figure 1. The dependent variable is the
interest rate r, which, for comparability with subsequent pre-
sentations of results, is reversely scaled. We see that r is higher
in the delay frame than in the speedup frame, which is the
delay–speedup asymmetry for receipts, and that r decreases
more sharply with delay length in the delay frame than in the
speedup frame, which is the novel result: The strength of the
delay effect depends on the frame.
Malkoc and Zauberman (2006) did not examine how their
result would generalize to payments, but our prediction is that
it will actually reverse for payments: We expect that r will be
higher in the speedup frame than in the delay frame, which is
the delay–speedup asymmetry for payments, and that r will
decrease more sharply with delay length in the speedup frame
than in the delay frame, a hypothetical representation of which
is given in the top right panel of Figure 1.
To see the rationale for our prediction, the bottom panels of
Figure 1 represent the same results in a different format, with the
respective panels representing short and long delays rather than
receipts and payments. What we see is an attenuation of the
delay–speedup asymmetry for longer delays. That is, r generally
decreases for longer delays, which is the delay effect, but also
becomes less affected by changes in outcome timing, which,
according to the tradeoff model, is a corollary of the delay effect.
The Basic Tradeoff Model
Consider a sooner outcome xS delayed by tS units of time, and
a larger outcome xL delayed by tL units of time. In the present
investigation, we consider only cases where the sooner outcome
is immediate, so that tS  0. When the outcomes are positive
(e.g., receiving $100 today or $150 in 1 year), SS has an
advantage along the time attribute (one will receive 1 year
sooner), while LL has an advantage along the outcome attribute
(one will receive $50 more). When the outcomes are negative
(e.g., paying $100 today or $150 in 1 year), SS has an advantage
along the outcome attribute (one will pay $50 less), while LL
has an advantage along the time attribute (one will pay 1 year
later).
Advantages do not enter the model as differences between
raw attribute amounts, but rather as differences between
amounts that are transformed to take the psychological impact
of time and outcome into account. Specifically, advantages are
differences between weighted delays, w(tL)  w(0)  w(tL),
and between valued outcomes, v(xL)  v(xS) for receipts and
v(xS)  v(xL) for payments. The decision maker will prefer SS
when its advantage is greater than that of LL, prefer LL when its
advantage is greater than that of SS, and be indifferent other-
wise. The indifference point is given as follows:
w(tL)v(xL) v(xS) if xL xS 0v(xS) v(xL) if xL xS 0, (5)
where   0 is a tradeoff parameter, which scales the difference
between weighted delays and the difference between valued
outcomes in a common currency.
The value function v and the time-weighing function w are
reference-dependent functions ranging from identity functions,
that is, v(x)  x and w(t)  t (constant sensitivity), to zero
functions, that is, v(x)  0 for all x, and w(t)  0 for all t
(insensitivity). Between these two limits, v and w are concave
functions, thus exhibiting diminishing absolute sensitivity
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1991): For constant absolute increases
of x and t, v(x) and w(t) increase by decreasing absolute
amounts. For instance, adding 1 day to a delay of 1 week yields
a greater increase in the weight of time than adding 1 day to a
delay of 52 weeks. Furthermore, v and w exhibit augmenting
proportional sensitivity (Scholten & Read, 2010): For constant
proportional increases of x and t, w(t) and v(x) increase by
increasing absolute amounts. For instance, doubling $100 yields
a greater increase in value than doubling $1. Finally, v exhibits
constant loss aversion (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991): Revers-
ing the sign of an outcome from positive to negative increases
the magnitude of its value by a multiplicative constant, that is,
v(x)  	v(x), where 	  1 and x  0.
The tradeoff model in Equation 5 accommodates all of the
anomalies described above, except for the delay–speedup asym-
metry, which is why we refer to it as the basic tradeoff model. In
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1194 SCHOLTEN AND READ
this model, loss aversion accounts for the gain–loss asymmetry,
because the value difference between paying $100 and paying
$150 is greater than the value difference between receiving $150
and receiving $100. Augmenting proportional sensitivity to out-
comes accounts for the absolute magnitude effect, because the
value difference between $1,500 and $1,000 is greater than the
value difference between $150 and $100. Diminishing absolute
sensitivity to delays, which is equivalent to hyperbolic discount-
ing, accounts for the delay effect, because the weight of a delay is
less than twice the weight of half the delay, or, more generally,
w(tL)  nw(tL/n), so that a long delay (tL) has proportionately less
weight than a short one (tL/n).1 Because the marginal impact of a
1 Given a discount function d, hyperbolic discounting is that there is
more discounting over an interval 0¡ t/2 than over an interval t/2¡ t, that
is, d(t/2)/d(0)  d(t)/d(t/2). Given Loewenstein and Prelec’s (1992) gen-
eralized hyperbolic discount function d(t)  (1  kt)b/k, where b  0 is
discounting and k  0 is the departure from exponential discounting,
log[d(t/2)/d(0)]  log[d(t)/d(t/2)] yields log(1  kt)  2 
 log(1  kt/2),
which is diminishing absolute sensitivity to delays.
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Figure 1. Hypothetical values of r (reversely scaled), showing the interaction between the delay–speedup
asymmetry and delay length, more specifically, an attenuation of the delay–speedup asymmetry for longer
delays. These hypothetical values also show the gain–loss asymmetry. In the bottom panels, the horizontal axis
represents a discrete variable and, therefore, does not imply interpolation.
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1195TIME AND OUTCOME FRAMING
delay decreases with its length, so does the marginal impact of any
change in outcome timing, which accounts for the attenuation of
the delay–speedup asymmetry for longer delays. But what drives
the delay–speedup asymmetry itself? This question is the focus
of the next two sections, in which we develop two alternative
explanations of this anomaly.
Outcome Framing
In this section, we first present the current explanation of the
delay–speedup asymmetry, which ascribes the anomaly to out-
come framing. We then identify two problems with it: One related
to its implications, and the other related to its substance. Finally,
we develop a version of the tradeoff model that continues to
ascribe the delay–speedup asymmetry to outcome framing, but
resolves the problems with the current explanation.
The Hyperbolic Discounting Model:
Reference Dependence and Loss Aversion
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) proposed outcome framing as an
explanation for the delay–speedup asymmetry. In their hyperbolic
discounting model, outcomes are evaluated as gains and losses
relative to a neutral reference point. In standard choices between
SS and LL, which we call the neutral frame, the reference point is
located at the status quo, so that gains and losses coincide with the
actual amounts to be received or paid. In a delay or speedup frame,
however, one outcome is the expected outcome whereas the other
outcome compensates for foregoing the expected outcome. Ob-
taining a receipt or incurring a payment when expected does not
carry any value, because it was expected. Foregoing the receipt or
payment carries value of opposite hedonic sign: Not obtaining a
receipt when expected is a loss, whereas not incurring a payment
when expected is a gain. The compensating outcome, which is
received or paid at a different time, is a gain or loss at that time.
Suppose one is indifferent between SS and LL in the neutral
frame. In Loewenstein and Prelec’s (1992) hyperbolic discounting
model, this means that the value of SS is equal to the discounted
value of LL:
v(xS) d(tL)v(xL)
or
v(xS) d(tL)v(xL) 0, (6)
where v is a value function and d is a generalized hyperbolic
discount function. In the delay frame, not obtaining an immediate
receipt is a loss that is to be compensated by a future receipt,
evaluated as a gain, and not incurring an immediate payment is a
gain that is to be compensated by a future payment, evaluated as
a loss. One will then be indifferent between delaying and not
delaying when there is full compensation:
v(xS) d(tL)v(xˆL) 0, (7)
where xˆL fully compensates for delaying xS. In the absence of loss
aversion, that is, v(x)  v(x), the compensating delayed out-
come xˆL in Equation 7 is equal to the delayed outcome xL in
Equation 6. However, in the presence of loss aversion, that is,
v(x)  v(x) for x  0 and v(x)  v(x) for x  0, this will
not be the case. For receipts, loss aversion magnifies the negative
value of not obtaining the immediate receipt, so that the compen-
sating delayed receipt must become larger. Thus, xˆL  xL  0,
which, in the exponential discounting model, shows up as a higher
discount rate in the delay frame than in the neutral frame. For
payments, loss aversion magnifies the negative value of incurring
the compensating delayed payment, so that this payment must
become smaller. Thus, xL  xˆL  0, which, in the exponential
discounting model, shows up as a lower discount rate in the delay
frame than in the neutral frame. By a similar derivation for the
speedup frame, we arrive at the delay–speedup asymmetry.
Loewenstein and Prelec’s (1992) explanation of the delay–
speedup asymmetry relies on the assumption that not obtaining an
expected receipt is a loss and not incurring an expected payment is
a gain, which we refer to as the symmetry assumption. As we
discuss next, this assumption is not innocuous.
The Symmetry Assumption
We discuss two problems with the symmetry assumption. One is
that it implies instances of negative time preference. The other is
that it equates opportunity costs and out-of-pocket costs.
Negative time preference. A premise in most analyses of
intertemporal choice is positive time preference: People discount
delayed outcomes, so that indifference between SS and LL can only
occur when a later outcome is larger than a sooner outcome. In the
delay–speedup domain, evidence is generally consistent with this
premise (e.g., Benzion et al., 1989; Malkoc & Zauberman, 2006;
McAlvanah, 2010; Shelley, 1993), even though, outside this re-
stricted domain, positive time preference is not as common in
losses as in gains (e.g., Yates & Watts, 1975, for monetary deci-
sions, and Ganiats et al., 2000, for health decisions). By invoking
the symmetry assumption, however, Loewenstein and Prelec’s
(1992) hyperbolic discounting model easily arrives at predictions
of negative time preference for gains as well as losses.
Predictions of negative time preference might result for the
speedup of gains and the delay of losses, where loss aversion
attenuates positive time preference, and potentially reverses it into
negative time preference. To illustrate this for the speedup of
gains, let us heuristically set the loss-aversion parameter at 	 
2.5, and let us further assume constant sensitivity to outcomes, that
is, v(x)  x (see also Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman, & Schwartz,
1997). If, in the neutral frame, the decision maker is indifferent
between receiving $100 today and receiving $150 in 1 year, we
have, by Equation 6, –100  d(1) 
 150  0, so that d(1)  .67.
In the speedup frame, the decision maker would demand a mini-
mum of xˆS to speed up $150 by 1 year. By Equation 7, we have
xˆS  .67 
 2.5 
 (150)  0, so that xˆS  $251.25, an instance
of negative time preference, because xˆS  xL. The problem, there-
fore, lies in the assumption that foregoing $150 is a full-blown loss
of $150.
No asymmetry between opportunity costs and out-of-pocket
costs. An early lesson from behavioral economics is that out-of-
pocket costs loom larger than opportunity costs. Thaler (1980)
described the case of a man who would refuse to mow his neigh-
bor’s lawn for $20 and yet mows his own same-sized lawn, even
though his neighbor’s son would be willing to mow it for only $8.
In this example, paying $8 feels worse than not obtaining $20, but,
more generally, the asymmetry between out-of-pocket costs and
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1196 SCHOLTEN AND READ
opportunity costs is that paying x feels worse than not receiving x.
The symmetry assumption, however, asserts that not obtaining an
expected receipt is a loss, meaning that not receiving x as expected
feels as bad as paying x. The anomalous prediction of negative
time preference suggests that this assertion is too strong: Even
foregoing an expected receipt does not have the same impact as a
loss, where unfulfilled expectation would presumably intensify the
sense of loss. We next develop a version of the tradeoff model that,
like Loewenstein and Prelec’s (1992) hyperbolic discounting
model, ascribes the delay–speedup asymmetry to outcome fram-
ing, but relaxes the symmetry assumption.
The Tradeoff Model:
Hypersensitivity and Hyposensitivity to
Worse and Better Than Expected States
The basic tradeoff model (Equation 5) does not distinguish
between outcomes on the basis of prior expectations. The value of
an outcome is v(x) and the value of an outcome foregone is v(x),
meaning that an outcome has the same impact as an outcome
foregone, that is, v(x)  v(x)  0, and so there will be no
delay–speedup asymmetry.
To accommodate the delay–speedup asymmetry, the tradeoff
model may incorporate outcome framing. Our proposal is that
foregoing an expected outcome will have more or less impact than
an expected outcome, depending on the sign of the outcome. On
the one hand, foregoing an expected receipt is a worse than
expected state, which has more impact than an unexpected receipt.
This is hypersensitivity to worse than expected states. On the other
hand, foregoing an expected payment is a better than expected
state, which has less impact than an unexpected payment. This is
hyposensitivity to better than expected states.
We can state this formally. The impact of an unexpected receipt
is v(x), a standard gain. The impact of an expected receipt foregone
is 	l v(x), where 	l  1 is hypersensitivity to worse than
expected states, and the subscript l indicates that the expected
receipt foregone is a loss. The expected but foregone receipt has
therefore more impact than the unexpected but obtained one.
Hypersensitivity decreases the outcome advantage of delaying a
receipt, vxˆL  	1vxS, and increases the outcome disadvantage
of speeding it up, 	lvxL vxˆS. To maintain indifference toward
the change in outcome timing, xˆL must become larger in the delay
frame, and xˆS must become larger in the speedup frame. The
increase in xˆL will show up as a higher discount rate, the increase
in xˆS as a lower one. That is, there will be more discounting in the
delay frame than in the speedup frame, which is the delay–speedup
asymmetry for receipts.
The situation for payments is the reflection of that for receipts.
The impact of an unexpected payment is v(x), a standard loss. The
impact of an expected payment foregone is 	g v(x), where 	g 
1 is hyposensitivity to better than expected states, and the subscript
g indicates that the expected payment foregone is a gain. The
expected but foregone payment has therefore less impact than the
unexpected but incurred one. Hyposensitivity increases the outcome
disadvantage of delaying a payment, 	gvxS  vxˆL, and decreases
the outcome advantage of speeding it up, vxˆS	gvxL. To maintain
indifference toward the change in outcome timing, xˆL must become
smaller in the delay frame, and xˆS must become smaller in the speedup
frame. The decrease in xˆL will show up as a lower discount rate, the
decrease in xˆS as a higher one. That is, there will be less discounting
in the delay frame than in the speedup frame, which is the delay–
speedup asymmetry for payments.
The above development of the tradeoff model ascribes the
delay–speedup asymmetry to outcome framing, and is therefore
referred to as the outcome-frame tradeoff model. In this model,
the decision maker will be indifferent toward a change in outcome
timing when:
w(tL)
v(xˆL)	lv(xS) delaying a receipt
	lv(xL) v(xˆS) speeding up a receipt
	gv(xS) v(xˆL) delaying a payment
v(xˆS)	gv(xL) speeding up a payment,
(8)
where 	l  1 is hypersensitivity to worse than expected states, and
	g  1 is hyposensitivity to better than expected states. When
neither outcome, xS or xL, is expected, so that 	l  	g  1, the
outcome-frame tradeoff model (Equation 8) reduces to the basic
tradeoff model (Equation 5), and predicts a full-blown gain–loss
asymmetry and no delay–speedup asymmetry. When, as under the
symmetry assumption, an expected receipt foregone has the same
impact as a payment, that is, 	l  	, and an expected payment
foregone has the same impact as a receipt, that is, 	g  1/	, the
model predicts a full-blown delay–speedup asymmetry and no
gain–loss asymmetry. Finally, when 1/	  	g  1  	l  	, it
predicts both asymmetries. The less the values of 	l and 	g depart
from their neutral value of 1, the less likely it becomes that the
outcome-frame tradeoff model yields negative time preference.
While the outcome-frame tradeoff model qualitatively predicts
all anomalies under consideration, we next achieve the same by
ascribing the delay–speedup asymmetry to time framing rather
than outcome framing.
Time Framing
Let us look again at the basic phenomenon. Suppose you expect
the delivery of a parcel today, but you are told that it can only be
delivered next month. How much would you have to be paid to feel
you are being fully compensated by the company for this delay?
Call this C. Now suppose you expect the delivery of a parcel next
month, but you are told that it can already be delivered today. How
much would you pay to feel you are fully compensating the
company for this speedup? Call this c. The delay–speedup asym-
metry is that C  c, but what is driving this effect?
According to the outcome-frame tradeoff model, it is because, in
both scenarios, you are in a worse than expected state when not
receiving the parcel when expected. This drives up the price you
demand in the delay frame, but drives down the price you offer in
the speedup frame. It seems a plausible explanation for the delay
frame, where you receive the desired parcel later rather than
sooner. It is less plausible, however, for the speedup frame, where
you receive the desired parcel sooner rather than later: Why be
frustrated when something good is happening to you sooner than
expected? In general, it seems plausible that one would be frus-
trated when something good comes later than expected and be
relieved when something bad comes later than expected, but it is
implausible that one would be frustrated when something good
comes sooner than expected and be relieved when something bad
comes sooner than expected.
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1197TIME AND OUTCOME FRAMING
When we change from outcome framing to time framing, we
arrive at a more plausible explanation of the delay–speedup asym-
metry. In the delay frame, something good is happening later
rather than sooner, which is treated as a loss of time, and hyper-
sensitivity to time lost drives up the price you demand. In the
speedup frame, something good is happening sooner rather than
later, which is treated as a gain of time, and hyposensitivity to time
gained drives down the price you offer. The converse occurs when
something bad will be happening, like being laid off. If the
notification says you will go tomorrow, you would be willing to
pay for delaying the lay-off. That is, you would pay for something
bad to happen later rather than sooner, which is treated as a gain
of time. Hyposensitivity to time gained drives down the price you
would offer for the delay. If the notification says you will go 6
months from now, you would want to be paid for speeding up the
lay-off. That is, you would be paid for something bad to happen
sooner rather than later, which is treated as a loss of time.2
Hypersensitivity to time lost drives up the price you would demand
for the speedup. It must be emphasized that no time is “gained” or
“lost” in and of itself; rather, time is gained or lost in obtaining
something good or incurring something bad.
More formally, the time disadvantage of delaying a receipt or
speeding up a payment is lwtL, where   0 is the tradeoff
parameter from Equation 5. Hypersensitivity to time lost, that is,
l  1, increases this time disadvantage. Thus, to maintain indif-
ference toward the change in outcome timing, xˆL must become
larger when delaying a receipt, and xˆS must become smaller when
speeding up a payment, which will show up as a higher discount
rate. On the other hand, the time advantage of speeding up a gain
or delaying a loss is gwtL. Hyposensitivity to time gained, that
is, 0  g  1, decreases this time advantage. Thus, to maintain
indifference toward the change in outcome timing, xˆS must become
larger in speeding up a receipt, and xˆL must become smaller in
delaying a payment, which will show up as a lower discount rate.
Altogether, there will be more discounting when delaying a receipt
than when speeding it up, and less discounting when delaying a
payment than when speeding it up, which is the delay–speedup
asymmetry.
The above development of the tradeoff model ascribes the
delay–speedup asymmetry to time framing, and is therefore re-
ferred to as the time-frame tradeoff model. In this model, the
decision maker will be indifferent toward a change in outcome
timing when:
lw(tL)
gw(tL)
gw(tL)
lw(tL)

v(xˆL) v(xS) delaying a receipt
v(xL) v(xˆS) speeding up a receipt
v(xS) v(xˆL) delaying a payment
v(xˆS) v(xL) speeding up a payment,
(9)
where l  1 is hypersensitivity to time lost, and 0  g  1 is
hyposensitivity to time gained. The time-frame tradeoff model
(Equation 9) reduces to the basic tradeoff model (Equation 5)
when neither outcome is expected, so that g  l  1.
In addition to the delay–speedup asymmetry, the time-frame
tradeoff model predicts the gain–loss asymmetry (loss aversion),
the absolute magnitude effect (augmenting proportional sensitivity
to outcomes), and both the delay effect and an attenuation of the
delay–speedup asymmetry for longer delays (diminishing absolute
sensitivity to delays). The outcome-frame tradeoff model yields
the same qualitative predictions. Given that the models produce the
same qualitative predictions, our purpose is to compare the models
on their quantitative predictions. The exponential discounting
model, which yields none of the above predictions, will serve as a
benchmark to evaluate the predictive accuracy of the tradeoff
models. Because the exponential discounting model may be
viewed as an overly naïve benchmark model, however, we next
turn to some more informed models that we will consider in our
model contest.
Simple Interest Rates and Hyperbolic Discount Rates
Extremely popular in research on intertemporal choice is the
notion of hyperbolic discounting, which, as Prelec (2004) ob-
served, “now functions almost as a default option for analyzing the
misbehavior of economic agents” (p. 511). So we must include that
default option in our analyses. The notion of hyperbolic discount-
ing emerges from a model in which the person will be indifferent
between SS and LL when:
xS(1 ktL) xL.
In this model, the person demands simple interest: Per unit of time,
the interest demanded is kxS, meaning that interest does not bear
interest. The simple-interest model accommodates the delay effect.
To illustrate, someone indifferent between $100 today and $150 in
1 year might also be indifferent between $100 today and $200 in
2 years. The simple interest rate is 50% in each case, but the
compound interest rate is 50% in the first case and 41% in the
second, which is the delay effect. The simple-interest model de-
scribes present-to-future conversion, but it may be changed so as
to describe future-to-present conversion instead, which is what the
hyperbolic discounting model does:
xS
1
1 ktL
xL, (10)
where 1/(1  ktL) is the hyperbolic discount function proposed by
Mazur (1987). Under hyperbolic discounting, there is not a single,
constant discount rate. Rather, the discount rate decreases with the
delay to the outcome. Specifically, over the per-period interval
t-1 ¡ t, the discount rate is:
t
k
1 kt
,
which decreases with delay length t. The hyperbolic discounting
model in Equation 10 and the exponential discounting model in
Equation 3 are both special cases of a model that includes the
generalized hyperbolic discount function proposed by Loewen-
stein and Prelec (1992):
xS
1
(1 ktL)b⁄k
xL, (11)
where b  0 is discounting and k  0 is the departure from
exponential discounting. This generalized hyperbolic discounting
2 This is even more obvious in strictly monetary tradeoffs: If you speed
up a payment, you can think of it as a loss of profit from investment or as
a loss of time during which the money could have been invested.
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1198 SCHOLTEN AND READ
model reduces to hyperbolic discounting model when b  k and to
the exponential discounting model when k goes toward zero, in
which case the discount function becomes ebtL  tL. The hyper-
bolic discounting model and the generalized hyperbolic discount-
ing model are widely used in empirical research on intertemporal
choice, so that they are suitable benchmark models. However, they
only accommodate the delay effect. Considering that our focal
anomaly is the delay–speedup asymmetry, we next incorporate this
anomaly as well into the generalized hyperbolic discounting
model.
Outcome Framing Revisited
In the section on outcome framing, we discussed how Loewen-
stein and Prelec’s (1992) hyperbolic discounting model explains
the delay–speedup asymmetry. The two ingredients were reference
dependence and loss aversion. We incorporate that explanation
into the generalized hyperbolic discounting model. When delaying
a receipt, the immediate receipt foregone is a loss, to be compen-
sated by a delayed receipt, which is a gain. Conversely, when
delaying a payment, the immediate payment foregone is a gain, to
be compensated by a delayed payment, which is a loss. The same
rationale applies when a receipt or a payment is expedited. The
decision maker will be indifferent toward changes in outcome
timing when:
0

xS d(tL)xˆL delaying a receipt
xˆS d(tL)
xL speeding up a receipt
xS d(tL)
xˆL delaying a payment

xˆS d(tL)xL speeding up a payment,
(12)
where 	  1 is loss aversion, and d is the generalized hyperbolic
discount function from Equation 11. The above discounting model
ascribes the delay–speedup asymmetry to outcome framing, and is
therefore referred to as the outcome-frame discounting model.
The outcome-frame discounting model accommodates all three
time-related anomalies: The delay–speedup asymmetry, the delay
effect, and an attenuation of the delay–speedup asymmetry for
longer delays. However, it does not cover the two outcome-related
anomalies: The gain–loss asymmetry and the absolute magnitude
effect. This is because the value function of the outcome-frame
discounting model exhibits constant sensitivity, where the value
function of Loewenstein and Prelec’s (1992) hyperbolic discount-
ing model exhibits diminishing absolute sensitivity and, to account
for the gain–loss asymmetry and the absolute magnitude effect,
two technical properties related to the elasticity of the value
function.3 Parametric specifications of such a value function are
inevitably complex (al-Nowaihi & Dhami, 2009; Scholten & Read,
2012), and there are still the problems, identified in the sections on
outcome framing and time framing, with the way in which Loe-
wenstein and Prelec’s (1992) hyperbolic discounting model ex-
plains the delay–speedup asymmetry. We therefore do not further
develop the benchmark models beyond the outcome-frame dis-
counting model.
Three Experimental Tests
We conducted three tests of the competing models. First, we
applied the models to the indifference data from the matching
study reported by Benzion et al. (1989). Because the design used
by these authors did not include the neutral frame, we subsequently
applied the models to the indifference data from a new matching
study that did include the neutral frame. Finally, we applied the
models to preference data from a new choice study. We offer
the first integrative analysis of indifference and preference in the
neutral, delay, and speedup frames, and the first quantitative ap-
plication of psychological choice models to data containing the
delay–speedup asymmetry.
Indifference Data From Matching:
A Reanalysis of Benzion et al. (1989)
Method
Independent and dependent variables. For 64 option pairs,
participants filled in the variable outcome xˆ that yielded indiffer-
ence between SS and LL. A concrete scenario designated this
variable outcome as a compensation for delaying or speeding up
the fixed outcome x. The 64 option pairs resulted from a 2
(decision frame: delay or speedup) 
 2 (outcome sign: positive
or negative) 
 4 (outcome magnitude: $40, $200, $1,000, or
$5,000) 
 4 (delay to the larger outcome: 1/2 year, 1 year, 2 years,
or 4 years) factorial design. Benzion et al. (1989) reported the
arithmetic means of the compound interest rates r, as given by
Equation 2. Although this practice is common (e.g., Malkoc &
Zauberman, 2006; Shelley, 1993), it is flawed because taking the
arithmetic mean of the interest rate r is not the same as taking the
arithmetic means of xS and xL and computing r from there (cf.
Kirby, 1997), meaning the functional relation between outcomes
and discount measures is not preserved in the aggregate data.
Model specification. Our theoretical introduction exhaus-
tively specified the competing models, except for the value func-
tion and the time-weighing function of the tradeoff models. As
proposed originally (Scholten & Read, 2010), these are specified
as normalized logarithmic functions. The value function is:
v(x)
1

log(1 x) if x 0




log(1(x)) if x 0,
where   0 is diminishing absolute sensitivity to outcomes and
	  1 is constant loss aversion. As  goes to zero, the value
function exhibits constant sensitivity, that is, v(x)  x for x  0
and v(x)  	x for x  0, and, as  goes to infinity, it exhibits
insensitivity, that is, v(x)  0. The time-weighing function is:
w(t) 1

log(1 t),
where   0 is diminishing absolute sensitivity to delays. The
limiting conditions are the same as those for the value function,
with diminishing sensitivity bordering on constant sensitivity
when  goes to zero and insensitivity when  goes to infinity.
3 Theoretical analyses of the delay–speedup asymmetry have typically
invoked constant sensitivity (Loewenstein, 1988; Scholten & Read, 2010;
Shelley, 1993).
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1199TIME AND OUTCOME FRAMING
Model estimation and evaluation. We estimated seven mod-
els: Three tradeoff models (basic, outcome-frame, and time-frame)
and four discounting models (exponential, hyperbolic, generalized
hyperbolic, and outcome-frame). The exponential discounting
model predicts a constant value of r, all other models predict that
it will vary. To estimate the models, we solved the equations of the
three tradeoff models (5, 8, and 9) and the four discounting models
(3, 10, 11, and 12) for the variable outcome xˆ, and inserted it, along
with the fixed outcome x and the delay tL, into Equation 2 to obtain
the predicted value of r. We estimated the models with the Hooke–
Jeeves and quasi-Newton routine in the nonlinear estimation mod-
ule of Statistica (StatSoft, 2003) by minimizing the sum of squared
deviations between the predicted and observed values of r. Given
this loss function, the exponential discounting model predicts the
mean value of r.
In comparing our models, we must take into account that data
are noisy, and that a more complex model is more flexible in
capturing the noise (Myung, Tang, & Pitt, 2009). That is, a
more complex model in terms of number of parameters and the
functional form (i.e., the way in which the parameters and the
variables are combined in the model equation) can come out
best from the model comparison because it is more flexible in
capturing the noise, and not because it best describes the mental
process (Pitt, Myung, & Zhang, 2002). Because the noise will
change from one data set to the other, while the regularity from
the mental process will not, the logical thing to do is to estimate
a model on one data set, and evaluate it on another; the more
noise a model captures in the estimation phase, the worse it will
fit in the evaluation phase, and, conversely, the more regularity
the model captures in the estimation phase, the better is will fit
in the evaluation phase (Myung et al., 2009). Therefore, we
must change from goodness-of-fit to generalizability as crite-
rion for model comparison. Among available methods, cross-
validation emerges as an easy-to use, heuristic method for
assessing generalizability (Pitt et al., 2002). We use n-fold
cross-validation, or the leave-one-out method, in which each
data point is predicted upon estimating the model on the re-
maining n-1 data points (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993). In this
reanalysis of Benzion et al. (1989), n  64. The models are
compared on their badness-of-fit, that is, the deviation between
observations and the predictions thus obtained.
Results
The results showed all preference patterns under study: The
delay–speedup asymmetry, the gain–loss asymmetry, the abso-
lute magnitude effect, and the delay effect. Figure 2 shows the
observed values of r, omitting outcome magnitude. (The values
of r are reversely scaled for comparability with subsequent
results.) We see the delay–speedup asymmetry, and, consistent
with Figure 1, its attenuation for longer delays. We further see
the gain–loss asymmetry for all delays, except for 2 years. This
is an anomalous result that the tradeoff models will be unable to
explain.
Table 1 shows the number of free parameters and the
badness-of-fit of the seven models. Because the design of
Benzion et al. (1989) does not include the neutral frame, the
time-frame tradeoff model cannot estimate both hypersensitiv-
ity to time lost and hyposensitivity to time gained, so that it has
one parameter less than the outcome-frame tradeoff model. We
estimated hypersensitivity, but we would obtain exactly the
same results if we estimated hyposensitivity instead. Going
down the list of competing models, badness-of-fit decreases,
with the time-frame tradeoff model coming out best.
The outcome-frame and time-frame tradeoff models are the
only ones that qualitatively predict the full range of anomalies
in these data. Table 2 shows the parameter estimates upon
estimating these models on the set of n data points. There is
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Figure 2. Benzion et al.’s (1989) indifference data from matching. This figure shows the observed values of
r (reversely scaled). We observe the delay–speedup asymmetry and its attenuation for longer delays.
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1200 SCHOLTEN AND READ
modest loss aversion (	), reflecting a modest gain–loss asym-
metry in the data. The time-frame tradeoff model exhibits
hypersensitivity to time lost (l), and the outcome-frame
tradeoff model exhibits hypersensitivity to worse than expected
states (	l) and hyposensitivity to better than expected states
(	g).
The top and bottom panels of Figure 3 show the predictions of the
outcome-frame tradeoff model and the time-frame tradeoff model,
respectively. It is clear that the time-frame tradeoff model most
closely reproduces the qualitative patterns in the data. Although both
models predict the delay–speedup and gain–loss asymmetries, and
their attenuation for longer delays, the outcome-frame tradeoff model
predicts far too much attenuation, so much so that, at the 4-year delay,
it predicts no delay–speedup asymmetry for gains.
Figure 4 shows the results for outcome magnitude. The models
yield the same predictions, involving progressively smaller de-
creases of r as outcome magnitude increases. The result for the
$5,000 outcomes, showing a relatively large decrease of r, is
anomalous to this prediction, and it suggests that outcomes of this
magnitude were qualitatively different for the participants.
More Indifference Data From Matching
In this study, we analyze indifference data from a matching study
that includes the neutral frame, so that we can estimate the full
time-frame tradeoff model, and evaluate the efficacy of this model
and the outcome-frame tradeoff model in predicting the gain–loss
asymmetry in both the neutral frame and the delay–speedup frames.
Method
Independent and dependent variables. There were 32 option
pairs resulting from a 2 (outcome matched: xL or xS) 
 2 (decision
frame: neutral or delay–speedup) 
 2 (outcome sign: positive or
negative) 
 2 (outcome magnitude: €100 or €900) 
 2 (delay to the
larger outcome: 1/2 year or 2 years) factorial design. The first two
factors were manipulated between participants, the others within
participant, so that each participant matched eight options pairs. For
each option pair, we computed the geometric mean of the per-period
discount factor  (Equation 4). This practice is to be recommended,
because taking the geometric mean of discount factor  is the same as
taking the geometric means of xS and xL and computing  from there,
meaning the functional relation between outcomes and discount mea-
sures is preserved in the aggregate data. Analyses were performed on
arithmetic means of log(). The full breakdown of our results is given
in Table 3.4
Participants. A total of 280 Portuguese residents, 45% male and
averaging 33 years of age, participated by completing an on-line
questionnaire. Invitations for participating in the investigation were
sent out by e-mail to the acquaintances of eight students who had
enrolled in a research seminar of the first author. The receivers of this
e-mail were urged to invite their acquaintances in turn. Most partic-
ipants had an academic degree (84%), and most were employed
(59%) or students (34%).
Procedure. Participants filled in the variable outcome that
yielded indifference between SS and LL. An item for the delay of
a receipt would read: “You are entitled to receive €100 today, but
you can choose to delay the receipt, and receive more in 2 years.”
The participants then filled in the blank in the following statement:
“Instead of receiving €100 today, I agree to delay the receipt if I
receive at a minimum €_____ in 2 years.” In the neutral frame, an
item for the xL matching of a receipt would read: “For me,
receiving €100 today is as good as receiving €_____ in 2 years”
(cf. Takeuchi, 2011).5 Similar items were developed for the re-
4 Ninety participants discounted an outcome by a greater amount over
the 1/2 year interval than over the 2 years interval for at least one of the
option pairs in the outcome sign 
 outcome magnitude subdesign, or
discounted the $100 outcome by a greater amount than the $900 outcome
for at least one of the option pairs in the outcome sign 
 delay length
subdesign. They were excluded from the analyses. The 68% survival rate
(190/280) is comparable to the 72% survival rate (204/282) reported by
Benzion et al. (1989), but their criterion was incomplete rather than
incorrect responding (but see Shelley, 1993; Thaler, 1981). The survival
rates were significantly higher for xL matching than for xS matching, .81 
.54  .27, 2(1)  23.64, p  .00, which suggests that our participants had
far less difficulty with present-to-future than with future-to-present con-
versions. The exclusion of inconsistent responders may not be innocuous,
in that their mental process may not be the same as that of the consistent
responders.
5 Shelley (1993, Figure 2, p. 811) operationalized the neutral frame as
follows: “You owe a debt of $x in t years to a public institute. What is the
(negative) value, $x, of that debt to you now?” Her results suggest that
this was understood as a speedup frame instead: Implied discount rates in
the “neutral” frame were higher for losses than for gains, just as they were
in the speedup frame.
Table 1
Benzion et al.’s (1989) Indifference Data From Matching: Badness-of-Fit Upon Cross-Validating the Discounting Models and the
Tradeoff Models on r
Model ka RMSDb log(L)c
Exponential discounting model 1 0.10 54.57
Hyperbolic discounting model 1 0.09 62.18
Generalized hyperbolic discounting model 2 0.08 67.94
Outcome-frame discounting model 3 0.07 75.12
Basic tradeoff model 4 0.07 80.66
Outcome-frame tradeoff model 6 0.06 86.90
Time-frame tradeoff model 5 0.04 108.40
a Number of free parameters. b The root-mean-square deviation, 	yiyˆii2⁄n, where n is the number of data points, yi is the observed value of
dependent variable y for data point i, and yˆii is the predicted value of y for data point i, obtained by estimating the model on the remaining n  1 data
points. The standard deviation, 	yiy2⁄n, where y is the mean value of y, is 0.10. c  logL  0.5nlog	yi  yˆii2⁄n  log2  1, where
log(L) is the maximum log-likelihood of the estimated model (see Burnham & Anderson, 2003; Spiess & Neumeyer, 2010).
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1201TIME AND OUTCOME FRAMING
maining conditions. In the introduction to the questionnaire, par-
ticipants completed a rehearsal trial. Upon completing the exper-
imental trials, they provided their demographics.
Results
We conducted a mixed-design analysis of variance (ANOVA)
on log() with three within-participant factors (outcome sign,
outcome magnitude, and delay length) and two between-
participants factors: One factor contrasted xL matching with xS
matching, the other factor contrasted the neutral frame with the
delay–speedup frames. Seven main results emerged from this
analysis: (1) The delay–speedup and gain–loss asymmetries in the
delay–speedup frames and the gain–loss asymmetry in the neutral
frame, F(1, 186)  21.40, p  .00, P2  .12; (2) the gain–loss
asymmetry across frames, F(1, 186)  13.66, p  .00, P2  .07;
(3) a less pronounced gain–loss asymmetry in the delay–speedup
frames than in the neutral frame, F(1, 186)  4.22, p  .04, P2 
.02; (4) an attenuation of the delay–speedup and gain–loss asym-
metries for longer delays, F(1, 186)  15.52, p  .00, P2  .08;
(5) the absolute magnitude effect, F(1, 186)  26.97, p  .00,
P
2  .14; (6) an attenuation of the absolute magnitude effect for
longer delays, F(1, 186)  5.62, p  .02, P2  .03; and (7) the
delay effect, F(1, 186)  81.41, p  .00, P2  .44.6 The left
panels of Figure 5 show the observed values of  along a loga-
rithmic scale. In the neutral frame, xS matching and xL matching
yielded virtually the same results, so that we collapse across these
conditions.
Table 4 shows the number of free parameters and the badness-
of-fit of the seven models upon n-fold cross-validation on the
experimental trials. Going down the list of competing models,
badness-of-fit decreases, but with one exception: The outcome-
frame discounting model, which fails to predict the gain–loss
asymmetry and the absolute magnitude effect, came out better than
the basic tradeoff model, which fails to predict the delay–speedup
asymmetry, and the outcome-frame tradeoff model, which quali-
tatively predicts all anomalies in the data. This suggests that the
added complexity of the outcome-frame tradeoff model captured
more noise than regularity. The time-frame tradeoff model comes
out best from the model contest.
Table 5 shows the parameter estimates upon estimating the
outcome-frame and time-frame tradeoff models on the full set of n
data points. Loss aversion (	) is more pronounced than in the
reanalysis of Benzion et al. (1989). In the time-frame tradeoff
model, hypersensitivity to time lost is more pronounced than
hyposensitivity to time gained, that is, log(l)  0.65  0.14 
log(g).7 In the outcome-frame tradeoff model, however, hyper-
sensitivity to worse than expected states is no more pronounced,
and slightly less pronounced, than hyposensitivity to better than
expected states, that is, log(	l)  0.05  log(	g)  0.06.
The center panels and right panels of Figure 5 show the predic-
tions of the outcome-frame tradeoff model and time-frame tradeoff
model, respectively. In the predictions of both models, the gain–
loss asymmetry is as pronounced in the delay–speedup frames as
in the neutral frame, whereas, in the data, the gain–loss asymmetry
is less pronounced in the delay–speedup frames than in the neutral
frame. This can be seen more easily in Figure 6. It can also be seen
that, across gains and losses, the outcome-frame tradeoff model
incorrectly predicts as much discounting in the delay–speedup
frames as in the neutral frame, while the time-framing tradeoff
model correctly predicts more discounting in the delay–speedup
frames than in the neutral frame. Omitted from Figures 5 and 6 is
outcome magnitude. Both tradeoff models closely reproduced the
absolute magnitude effect and its attenuation for longer delays.
6 Corollary and secondary results emerged from the ANOVA: (I) More
discounting in the delay–speedup frames than in the neutral frame, F(1,
186)  6.01, p  .02, P2  .03; (II) an attenuation of the difference in
discounting between the delay–speedup frames and the neutral frame for
longer delays, F(1, 186)  10.80, p  .00, P2  .06; (III) an outcome sign
by outcome matched interaction across decision frames, F(1, 186) 20.37,
p  .00, P2  .11 (a corollary of Result 1); (IV) an attenuation of the
outcome sign by outcome matched interaction for longer delays, F(1,
186)  13.00, p  .00, P2  .07 (a corollary of Result 4); (V) an outcome
sign by outcome magnitude interaction, in that the gain–loss asymmetry
was more pronounced for small outcomes than for large ones, F(1, 186) 
7.74, p  .01, P2  .04 (see Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992); (VI) an
attenuation of the outcome sign by outcome magnitude interaction for
longer delays, F(1, 186)  4.12, p  .04, P2  .02; (VII) an outcome
magnitude by outcome matched interaction, in that the absolute magnitude
effect was more pronounced when the later outcome was matched than
when the sooner outcome was matched, F(1, 186)  17.16, p  .00, P2 
.09; and (VIII) an attenuation of the outcome magnitude by outcome
matched interaction for longer delays, F(1, 186) 7.70, p  .01, P2  .04.
7 Because l  1 and 0  g  1, we must compare log(l) with
log(g).
Table 2
Benzion et al.’s (1989) Indifference Data From Matching: Parameter Estimates and Statistical Tests Upon Estimating the Tradeoff
Models on r
Outcome framing Time framing
Parameter Estimate t(58)a p Parameter Estimate t(59)a p
 7.53 6.06 .00  6.39 7.93 .00
l 1.45 7.25 .00
 1.75 3.68 .00  1.77 4.91 .00
 0.04 6.54 .00  0.04 8.84 .00

 1.07 1.31 .10 
 1.13 2.88 .00
	l 1.01 3.87 .00
	g 0.99 3.25 .00
Note. The models were estimated on 64 data points (see Benzion et al., 1989, Table 1).
a Testing whether , , and  are reliably greater than zero, whether l, 	, and 	l are reliably greater than one, and whether 	g is reliably smaller than one.
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1202 SCHOLTEN AND READ
It is possible to run an additional cross-validation check, be-
cause, in the introduction to the questionnaire, the participants
performed a rehearsal trial involving a medium-large gain (€300,
the geometric mean of €100 and €900) over a medium-length
interval (1 year, the geometric mean of 1/2 year and 2 years), and
this trial can be used for cross-validation. For each model, we used
the parameters estimated from the 32 experimental trials to predict
log() in the four different rehearsal trials corresponding to the
four cells in the 2 (outcome matched) 
 2 (decision frame)
between-participants subdesign. This subdesign only includes the
delay–speedup asymmetry, and none of the remaining anomalies
(i.e., the gain–loss asymmetry, the absolute magnitude effect, the
delay effect, and the attenuation of the delay–speedup asymmetry
for longer delays). The results are shown in Table 4, under the
heading “rehearsal trial.” Among the models that fail to predict the
delay–speedup asymmetry, the basic tradeoff model came out
worse than the three discounting models (exponential, hyperbolic,
and generalized hyperbolic), and, among these discounting mod-
els, the generalized hyperbolic discounting model came out worse
than the two discounting models it includes as special cases
(exponential and hyperbolic), suggesting that the added complex-
ity may be a handicap in the extrapolation to stimuli with different
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Figure 3. Benzion et al.’s (1989) indifference data from matching. This figure shows the predicted values of
r from the outcome-frame tradeoff model (top panel) and the time-frame tradeoff model (bottom panel).Th
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1203TIME AND OUTCOME FRAMING
characteristics (i.e., a constant rather than a varying outcome sign,
a different and constant outcome magnitude, and a different and
constant delay length). Again, the outcome-frame tradeoff model
came out worse than the outcome-frame discounting model,
which, in turn, came out worse than the time-frame tradeoff model,
the winner in this additional cross-validation check.
Discussion
Among the models that predict the delay–speedup asymmetry,
the time-frame tradeoff model came out better than the outcome-
frame tradeoff model and the outcome-frame discounting model,
consistent with our reanalysis of the data from Benzion et al.
(1989). However, outcome-frame tradeoff model came out slightly
worse than the outcome-frame discounting model, when the for-
mer is more comprehensive than the latter. This suggests that the
added complexity of the outcome-frame tradeoff model captured
more noise than regularity, even though it captured the gain–loss
asymmetry and the absolute magnitude effect, whereas the
outcome-frame discounting model did not. Actually, our own
matching data may have been noisier than Benzion et al.’s data,
Table 3
Indifference Data From Matching: Delays, Outcomes, and Per-Period Discount Factors
Neutral framea Delay–speedup framesb
tL
c xS
d xL
d e tL
c xS
d xL
d e
½ 100 159.45 .393 ½ 100 204.08 .240
2 100 264.27 .615 2 100 364.67 .524
½ 900 1,054.51 .728 ½ 900 1256.70 .513
2 900 1,434.68 .792 2 900 1,798.23 .707
½ 100 122.63 .665 ½ 100 140.43 .507
2 100 185.96 .733 2 100 202.73 .702
½ 900 999.60 .811 ½ 900 972.14 .857
2 900 1,134.70 .891 2 900 1,172.60 .876
½ 70.39 100 .496 ½ 74.44 100 .554
2 44.94 100 .670 2 61.27 100 .783
½ 659.72 900 .537 ½ 735.40 900 .668
2 493.62 900 .741 2 653.14 900 .852
½ 86.23 100 .744 ½ 62.47 100 .390
2 61.53 100 .784 2 53.56 100 .732
½ 757.91 900 .709 ½ 536.97 900 .356
2 629.56 900 .836 2 452.68 900 .709
a N  61 (xL matching) and N  46 (xS matching). b N  53 (delay frame) and N  30 (speedup frame). c Delays in years. d Outcomes in euros.
Geometric means. e Geometric means.
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Figure 4. Benzion et al.’s (1989) indifference data from matching. Observed and predicted values of r
(reversely scaled). Predictions from the tradeoff models. We observe the absolute magnitude effect for $200, its
attenuation for $1,000, and its accentuation for $5,000.
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1204 SCHOLTEN AND READ
because the overall performance of all seven models, as indexed by
the percentage of the variance in the dependent variable unac-
counted for, was so much worse. For instance, the badness-of-fit of
the time-frame tradeoff model, which came out best in both model
contests, was as high as 48% for our own matching data, but only
19% for Benzion et al.’s data. So why the noisier data?
We suggest that matching tasks are complicated, and that
they were more complicated for our own participants than for
Benzion et al.’s (1989) participants. Their participants were
students who had completed at least 2-year courses of econom-
ics or finance, and were therefore well familiar with the eco-
nomic theory of discount rates. Most of our own participants
also had academic backgrounds, but were probably not as
sophisticated in economic and financial matters as Benzion et
al.’s students. Economic theory includes two basic discounting
effects: Outcomes are discounted by a greater amount over
longer intervals than over shorter ones (in Equations 3 and 10,
the difference between xL and xS is larger the longer tL), and
larger outcomes are discounted by a greater amount than
smaller ones (the difference between xL and xS is larger the
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Figure 5. Indifference data from matching. Observed and predicted values of  (logarithmic scale). Predictions
from the tradeoff models. Neutral frame collapsed across xS-matching and xL-matching conditions. We observe
the delay–speedup asymmetry and the gain–loss asymmetry and, in the comparison between the two panels, the
delay effect and the attenuation of the delay–speedup asymmetry for longer delays.
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1205TIME AND OUTCOME FRAMING
larger xL). There is no psychological theory of intertemporal
choice that disagrees with this basic logic. However, one third
of our participants violated it at least once (see Footnote 4). We
excluded these participants from our analyses, but the data from
the remaining participants may still have been noisier than the
data from Benzion et al.’s students. This is not to devalue model
testing in noisy environments, but to explain why the models
performed worse on our own data.
It is also very important to emphasize that we fitted our
models to per-period discount factors, in contrast with common
practice in the experimental literature, which is to fit models to
the variable outcome that yields indifference between SS and
LL, and then report R2 (e.g., Green, Myerson, & Macaux, 2005;
Kirby, 1997; Murphy et al., 2001; Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross,
1991; Scholten & Read, 2006). The R2 values go well into the
nineties, with very little discrimination between the models. For
instance, in our matching study, the exponential discounting
model would have achieved 95.4% fit, the outcome-frame
tradeoff model a 98.2% fit, and the time-frame tradeoff model
a 98.5% fit: Skyrocketing performance with almost no discrim-
ination between the models. The difference between outcomes,
as analyzed in the literature, and per-period discount factors, as
analyzed by us, is that the former include basic discounting
effects, whereas the latter do not. Because all models, including
the exponential discounting model, predict these basic discount-
ing effects, the overall performance of the models increases,
while the discrimination between the models decreases. To
avoid this, one should replace outcomes by per-period discount
factors as the dependent variable. Although the exponential
discounting model predicts variation in outcomes as far as this
variation reflects basic discounting effects, it predicts no vari-
ation in per-period discount factors. When estimated and eval-
uated on n per-period discount factors, it therefore achieves a
0% fit where the performance of alternative models is usually
much better. For instance, in our matching study, the outcome-
frame tradeoff model would have achieved a 65.9% fit, and the
time-frame tradeoff model a 75.5% fit. Overall, per-period
discount factors result in a much better discrimination between
the models.
Preference Data From Choice
A problem with the analysis of indifference data from matching
is that the delay–speedup asymmetry may be driven by the
willingness-to-pay/willingness-to-accept discrepancy: People may
understate the compensation they are willing to pay for a desirable
change (receiving sooner or paying later, which are time gains in
the time-frame tradeoff model) and overstate the compensation
they want to receive for an undesirable change (receiving later or
paying sooner, which are time losses in the time-frame tradeoff
Table 4
Indifference Data From Matching: Badness-of-Fit Upon Cross-Validating the Discounting Models and the Tradeoff Models on Log()
Experimental trials Rehearsal trial
Model k RMSDa log(L) RMSDb log(L)
Exponential discounting model 1 0.31 7.55 0.20 0.82
Hyperbolic discounting model 1 0.28 4.68 0.19 0.96
Generalized hyperbolic discounting model 2 0.27 3.60 0.20 0.75
Outcome-frame discounting model 3 0.23 0.96 0.11 3.00
Basic tradeoff model 4 0.26 2.72 0.21 0.66
Outcome-frame tradeoff model 6 0.24 0.74 0.13 2.49
Time-frame tradeoff model 6 0.20 5.35 0.09 3.96
a The standard deviation of log() for the set of 32 data points resulting from a 2 (outcome matched) 
 2 (decision frame) 
 2 (outcome sign) 
 2 (outcome
magnitude) 
 2 (delay to the larger outcome) design (see Table 3) is 0.30. b The standard deviation of log() for the set of 4 data points resulting from
a 2 (outcome matched) 
 2 (decision frame) subdesign is 0.19.
Table 5
Indifference Data From Matching: Parameter Estimates and Statistical Tests Upon Estimating the Tradeoff Models on Log()
Outcome framing Time framing
Parameter Estimate t(26)a p Parameter Estimate t(26)a p
 49.82 1.58 .06  54.04 1.79 .04
l 1.91 3.93 .00
g 0.87 0.86 .20
 5.36 1.11 .14  6.83 1.25 .11
 0.02 1.95 .03  0.02 2.50 .01

 1.42 2.07 .02 
 1.49 2.68 .01
	l 1.05 2.48 .01
	g 0.94 3.08 .00
Note. The models were estimated on 32 data points (see Table 3).
a Testing whether , , and  are reliably greater than zero, whether l, 	, and 	l are reliably greater than one, and whether g and 	g are reliably smaller
than one.
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1206 SCHOLTEN AND READ
model). According to Loewenstein (1988), straight choice cannot
be affected by the willingness-to-pay/willingness-to-accept dis-
crepancy, and so we will conduct an analysis of preference data
from choice. In preference data, the delay–speedup asymmetry
should show up as inertia, or a bias against changing plans, which
is an intertemporal variant of the status-quo bias (Kahneman,
Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991; Ritov & Baron, 1992; W. Samuelson &
Zeckhauser, 1988).
Method
Independent and dependent variables. Participants were as-
signed to one out of 3 (decision frame: neutral, delay, or speedup)
conditions. Each participant within these conditions made a choice
from each of eight option pairs resulting from a 2 (outcome sign:
positive or negative) 
 2 (outcome magnitude: small or large) 

2 (delay to the larger outcome: 1/2 year or 2 years) factorial
subdesign. The outcomes were computed as xS  xR⁄1  rtL⁄2 and
xL  xR1  rtL⁄2, where r  .05 (with tL expressed in months),
xR  €100 for “small” outcomes, and xR  €500 (approximately)
for “large” outcomes. The outcomes xS and xL were rounded to the
nearest €5. The option pairs are shown in Table 6.
In the qualitative analysis of experimental effects, the dependent
variable is preference for LL (gains) or SS (losses). In the quanti-
tative modeling of the experimental data, the dependent variable is
strength of preference, defined as the log-odds of choosing LL
(gains) or SS (losses), that is, log()  log[P/(1  P)], where P is
a choice probability. Higher values of log() indicate less dis-
counting. The observed values of  are shown in Table 6.
Model specification. Model predictions are obtained by tak-
ing the logarithm of the ratio between the Right-Hand Side and the
Left-Hand Side of the model equations, that is, log() log(RHS/
LHS).8 For the tradeoff models, in which RHS and LHS represent
pairwise advantages, the above specification is equivalent to
Restle’s (1961) choice model.
We adopt what is known in the literature on risky choice as the
representative agent approach (Wu & Markle, 2008) or single-
agent stochastic choice method (Camerer & Ho, 1994; Wu &
Gonzalez, 1996), which assumes that all participants have the
same underlying preferences, but that their choices are stochasti-
cally determined by the model equation, that is, the ratio between
RHS and LHS. There are two justifications for this approach (see
Camerer & Ho, 1994, for more). First, the participants did not
contribute to all data points, only to one third of them, so that the
complete models could not have been estimated. Second, inter-
temporal choice data contain a good deal of noise at the individual
level, so that the models would have had great difficulty detecting
the signal. These were also our considerations for not analyzing
intertemporal matching data at the individual level.
Participants. A total of 298 Portuguese residents, 36% male and
averaging 33 years of age, participated by completing an on-line
questionnaire. The recruitment of the participants was the same as in
the matching study. Although most e-mails were sent out to persons
who had not participated in that study, some overlap between the
samples cannot be ruled out. Most participants had an academic
degree (80%), and most were employed (61%) or students (28%).
Procedure. The choice tasks were presented as in the examples
given in the introduction to this article. Because the delay–speedup
frames interchange the order of SS and LL, the same was done for the
8 The generic model could also be stated as log()  log((RHS/LHS)1/ε),
where ε is a noise parameter (Andersen, Harrison, Lau, & Rutström, 2010)
varying between no noise (ε toward zero), in which case choice favors the
best option for sure, and only noise (ε toward infinity), in which case
choice is a coin flip. In the present analyses, ε consistently converged to its
neutral value of 1.
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Figure 6. Indifference data from matching. Observed and predicted values of  (logarithmic scale). Predictions
from the tradeoff models. We observe a less pronounced gain–loss asymmetry and more discounting in the
delay–speedup frames than in the neutral frame.
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1207TIME AND OUTCOME FRAMING
neutral frame. In the introduction to the questionnaire, participants
completed a rehearsal trial. Upon completing the experimental trials,
they provided their demographics.
Results
We stacked the data file, and conducted a factorial probit analysis
on preference for LL (gains) or SS (losses). Three factors corre-
sponded to the within-participant subdesign (outcome sign, outcome
magnitude, and delay length), and two factors corresponded to the
between-participants subdesign: One factor contrasted one presenta-
tion order (SS–LL) with the reverse order (LL–SS), the other factor
contrasted the neutral frame with the delay–speedup frames. Four
main results emerged from this analysis: (1) The delay–speedup and
gain–loss asymmetries in the delay–speedup frames and the gain–loss
asymmetry in the neutral frame, 2(1)  13.41, p  .00; (2) the
gain–loss asymmetry across frames, 2(1)  130.91, p  .00; (3) the
absolute magnitude effect, 2(1)  17.30, p  .00; and (4) the delay
effect, 2(1)  51.94, p  .00.9 The left panels of Figure 7 show the
observed values of  along a logarithmic scale, as a measure of the
strength of preference for LL (gains) or SS (losses).
Table 7 shows the number of free parameters and the badness-
of-fit of the seven models upon n-fold cross-validation on the
experimental trials. The generalized hyperbolic discounting model
could not be estimated, because it went off toward an infinite
departure from exponential discounting (k went toward infinity).
Thus, the outcome-frame discounting model incorporates the hy-
perbolic discount function rather the generalized hyperbolic dis-
count function. Both the outcome-frame discounting model and the
hyperbolic discounting model converged on zero discounting (k
went toward zero), as did the exponential discounting model (r
went to zero). This is why the badness-of-fit of the hyperbolic
discounting model and the exponential discounting model is the
same. Going down the list of competing models, badness-of-fit
decreases, with the time-frame tradeoff model coming out best.
Table 8 shows the parameter estimates upon estimating the
outcome-frame and time-frame tradeoff models on the full set of n
data points. Loss aversion (	) is much more pronounced in choice
than in matching, reflecting a much larger asymmetry between
gains and losses. In the time-frame tradeoff model, hypersensitiv-
ity to time lost is more pronounced than hyposensitivity to time
gained, log(l)  0.50  log(g)  0.33. In the outcome-frame
tradeoff model, however, hypersensitivity to worse than expected
states is less pronounced than hyposensitivity to better than ex-
pected states, log(	l)  0.04  log(	g)  0.08.
The center panels and right panels of Figure 7 show the predictions
of the outcome-frame tradeoff model and the time-frame tradeoff
model, respectively. For longer delays, we see an attenuation of the
delay–speedup asymmetry in gains and an accentuation of the delay–
speedup asymmetry in losses, contrary to the findings from matching.
The time-frame tradeoff model predicts no moderating effect of delay
length, whereas the outcome-frame tradeoff model predicts a pro-
nounced attenuation of the delay–speedup asymmetry in both gains
and losses. Omitted from Figure 7 is outcome magnitude. Both
tradeoff models closely reproduced the absolute magnitude effect, but
not its accentuation for longer delays (see Footnote 9): Neither model
predicted a moderating effect of delay length.
Finally, it is again possible to run an additional cross-validation
check, because, in the introduction to the questionnaire, the partici-
pants performed a rehearsal trial involving medium-large gains (€165
and €300) over a medium-length interval (1 year), and this trial can be
used for cross-validation. For each model, we used the parameters
estimated from the 24 experimental trials to predict log() in the three
different rehearsal trials corresponding to the three cells in the 3
(decision frames) between-participants subdesign. This subdesign
therefore only includes the delay–speedup asymmetry, and none of
the remaining anomalies. The results are shown in Table 7, under the
heading “rehearsal trial.” The outcome-frame discounting model
came out slightly better than the basic tradeoff model in this cross-
validation check. Among the best performing models, the time-frame
tradeoff model wins out over the outcome-frame tradeoff model.
General Discussion
We developed two alternative versions of the tradeoff model
(Scholten & Read, 2010) to address situations in which an
outcome is expected at a given time, but then its timing is
changed. The outcome framing model proposes that not obtain-
ing a positive outcome when expected is a worse than expected
state, to which people are hypersensitive, and that not incurring
a negative outcome when expected is a better than expected
state, to which people are hyposensitive. The time framing model
proposes that delaying a positive outcome or speeding up a neg-
ative one is a loss of time, to which people are hypersensitive, and
that speeding up a positive outcome or delaying a negative one is
a gain of time, to which people are hyposensitive. We compared
the two models on their quantitative predictions of indifference
data from matching and preference data from choice, and the time
framing tradeoff model systematically outperformed the outcome
framing model.
From a logical point of view, our findings may come as no
surprise: When the situation is a change in the timing of an
outcome, then the reaction of people is to the change in timing, not
9 Corollary and secondary results emerged from the probit analysis: (I)
An outcome sign by presentation order interaction across decision frames,
2(1)  18.18, p  .00 (a corollary of Result 1); (II) an outcome sign by
outcome magnitude interaction, in that the gain–loss asymmetry was more
pronounced for small outcomes than for large ones, 2(1)  8.29, p  .00
(see Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992); and (III) an accentuation of the absolute
magnitude effect for longer delays, 2(1)  8.99, p  .00.
Table 6
Preference Data From Choice: Delays, Outcomes, and Choice
Odds
Option pairs a
tL
b xS
c xL
c Neutral Delay Speedup
½ 85 115 0.73 0.54 1.46
2 55 180 0.96 0.79 1.84
½ 430 575 0.93 1.00 1.46
2 280 895 3.73 2.91 2.48
½ 85 115 2.85 4.73 1.77
2 55 180 5.50 6.82 3.00
½ 430 575 3.33 3.78 1.30
2 280 895 8.46 13.33 2.72
a N  104 (neutral frame), N  86 (delay frame), and N  108 (speedup
frame). b Delays in years. c Outcomes in euros.
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1208 SCHOLTEN AND READ
to the outcome whose timing is being changed. However, the time
framing model had no precedent in the literature, while the out-
come framing model had. The latter generalizes Loewenstein and
Prelec’s (1992) analysis of the delay–speedup asymmetry, in
which not obtaining an expected positive outcome weighs as much
as a loss, and not incurring an expected negative outcome weighs
as little as a gain. The outcome framing model allows reactions to
expected outcomes foregone to be less extreme than that. Even so,
its quantitative predictions were systematically less accurate than
those of the time framing model.
There is also something strange about the way in which the
outcome framing model tried to account for the results: Hypersen-
sitivity to worse than expected states was estimated to be less
pronounced than hyposensitivity to better than expected states,
contrary to ubiquitous evidence showing that “bad is stronger than
good” (Baumeister, Bratlavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). The
time framing model, however, acted in accordance with this:
Hypersensitivity to time lost was estimated to be more pronounced
than hyposensitivity to time gained. The time framing model
therefore outperformed the outcome framing model not only in
terms of predictive accuracy, but also in terms of interpretability.
So the question arises: Is there any room for outcome framing in
the explanation of the delay–speedup asymmetry? Probably not for
the kind of framing used by us and others who investigated the
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Figure 7. Preference data from choice. Observed and predicted values of  (logarithmic scale). Predictions
from the tradeoff models. We observe the delay–speedup asymmetry and the gain–loss asymmetry and, in the
comparison between the two panels, the delay effect.
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1209TIME AND OUTCOME FRAMING
delay–speedup asymmetry, but other kinds of framing may favor
the outcome framing model. For instance, we framed the delay of
a receipt as follows: “You are entitled to receive $100 today. You
can choose to receive $100 today as planned, or delay the receipt
and receive $150 in 1 year.” This is a neutral delay frame, in that,
a priori, it does not seem to favor either the time framing model or
the outcome framing model: It conveys, in the simplest wording
possible, the occurrence of a delay. It does, however, leave the
foregone gain of $100 today implicit, and a biased delay frame can
make it explicit, as follows: “You can choose to receive $100
today as planned, or delay the receipt and receive $0 today but
$150 in 1 year.” By making the foregone gain explicit, the biased
delay frame communicates that, when you delay, you will be in a
worse than expected state today, which may promote outcome
framing, and therefore favor the outcome framing model.
It is not sure that the explicit zero will change the mental process
from time framing to outcome framing. Magen, Dweck, and Gross
(2008) inserted explicit zeroes into an otherwise neutral frame.
Thus, for instance, a choice between “$100 today” and “$150 in 1
year” became “$100 today and $0 in 1 year” and “$0 today and
$150 in 1 year.” This increased the popularity of LL over SS. An
extension of the tradeoff model to sequences accommodates this
result (Read & Scholten, 2012), and other known and new anom-
alies in choices involving sequences. In the extended tradeoff
model, a sequence of outcomes is treated as a single dated out-
come: It is the sum of the outcomes in the sequence, which is
available not at the beginning of the sequence (because the later
outcome has yet to occur), and not at the end of the sequence
(because the sooner outcome has already occurred), but “some-
where in between.” The extended tradeoff model has a mechanism
to determine where. Thus, for the sequence “$100 today and $0 in
1 year,” the adjusted delay lies somewhere between today and 1/2
year, and, for the sequence “$0 today and $150 in 1 year,” the
adjusted delay lies somewhere between 1/2 year and 1 year. Thus,
the delay of SS has lengthened, the delay of LL has shortened, and
we therefore see an increased popularity of LL over SS. Plausibly,
a person engaged in delay adjustment (which concerns the delay
itself) may also become engaged in time framing (which concerns
the weight of the delay) when the neutral frame changes into a
delay or speedup frame. Thus, we should see the delay–speedup
asymmetry, with the explicit zero increasing the willingness to
delay a receipt (LL) and decreasing the willingness to speed it up
(SS). For payments, it would be the other way around. Clearly,
subtleties in framing appear a fertile ground for future research on
intertemporal choice.
We benchmarked the performance of the tradeoff models
against a number of discounting models, including Mazur’s (1987)
hyperbolic discount function and Loewenstein and Prelec’s (1992)
generalized hyperbolic discount function, both very popular de-
vices in research on intertemporal choice. Their performance was
very poor, when they are usually portrayed as performing so well.
There are several reasons for this.
First, as mentioned earlier, there is the dependent variable: The
models are usually fit to the outcomes that yield indifference
between the options, not to per-period discount factors at the
indifference point. Outcomes include basic discounting effects:
They are discounted by a greater amount over longer intervals than
over shorter ones, and larger outcomes are discounted by a greater
amount than smaller ones. Any model, including the exponential
discounting model, predicts this. Inclusion of basic discounting
effects in the dependent variable drives up the overall performance
of the models, with very little discrimination between them. The
per-period discount factors remove basic discounting effects from
the dependent variable. The overall performance of the models will
Table 7
Preference Data From Choice: Badness-of-Fit Upon Cross-Validating the Discounting Models and the Tradeoff Models on Log()
Experimental trials Rehearsal trial
Model k RMSDa log(L) RMSDb log(L)
Exponential discounting model 1 0.75 27.30 0.48 2.07
Hyperbolic discounting model 1 0.75 27.30 0.48 2.07
Outcome-frame discounting model 2 0.70 25.43 0.33 0.91
Basic tradeoff model 4 0.54 19.34 0.38 1.33
Outcome-frame tradeoff modelc 6 0.43 14.04 0.28 0.43
Time-frame tradeoff model 6 0.40 12.05 0.17 1.15
a The standard deviation of log() for the set of 24 data points resulting from a 3 (decision frame) 
 2 (outcome sign) 
 2 (outcome magnitude) 
 2 (delay
to the larger outcome) design (see Table 6) is 0.81. b The standard deviation of log() for the set of 3 data points corresponding to the 3 decision frames
is 0.38. c The outcome framing discounting model incorporates Mazur’s (1987) hyperbolic discount function rather than the generalized hyperbolic
discount function, which could not be estimated.
Table 8
Preference Data From Choice: Parameter Estimates and
Statistical Tests Upon Estimating the Tradeoff Models on
Log()
Outcome framing Time framing
Parameter Estimate t(18)a p Parameter Estimate t(18)a p
 56.43 1.97 .03  55.92 1.84 .04
l 1.62 2.17 .02
g 0.72 2.26 .02
 3.07 1.33 .10  4.37 1.38 .09
 0.01 1.92 .04  0.01 1.96 .03

 3.26 4.28 .00 
 2.96 4.61 .00
	l 1.04 1.62 .06
	g 0.92 4.12 .00
Note. The models were estimated on 24 data points (see Table 6).
a Testing whether , , and  are reliably greater than zero, whether l, 	,
and 	l are reliably greater than one, and whether g and 	g are reliably
smaller than one.
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1210 SCHOLTEN AND READ
plunge, with the exponential discounting model being reduced to
the null model, because it predicts per-period discount factors to be
constant. Hyperbolic discounting models will improve on that by
predicting that per-period discount factors will rise with delay
length, but their performance will be less impressive than in the
prediction of outcomes.
Second, hyperbolic discounting models are usually evaluated on
their goodness-of-fit rather than their generalizability. That is, the
models are estimated on data, and are then evaluated on their fit to
the data on which they were estimated. This also drives up the
overall performance of the models, because they will capture not
only regularity from the mental process, but also noise. Because
the noise changes from one data set to the other, but the regularity
does not, the solution is to evaluate the models on their fit to data
on which they were not estimated. Generalizability will often be
less impressive than goodness-of-fit, with more complex models
being penalized insofar as their added complexity captures more
noise than regularity.
Third, hyperbolic discounting models are usually evaluated in
severely impoverished environments: The magnitude and sign of a
delayed outcome is held constant, the delay to the outcome is
varied, the immediate outcome that yields indifference between it
and the delayed outcome is determined for each delay, and a
hyperbolic discounting model is fit to the outcomes that yield
indifference. The only anomaly that can happen in this environ-
ment is the delay effect, which hyperbolic discounting models
accommodate. However, apart from the delay effect and basic
discounting effects, they accommodate nothing else. We evaluated
hyperbolic discounting models in a more enriched environment,
featuring not only the delay effect, but also the absolute magnitude
effect, the gain–loss asymmetry, the delay–speedup asymmetry,
and its attenuation for longer delays. In such an environment, the
hyperbolic discounting models perform poorly, unless they are
enriched themselves, such as, in our research, by outcome framing.
The time framing model adds two parameters to a basic tradeoff
model that does not accommodate the delay–speedup asymmetry.
The addition of these two parameters paid off, because the gener-
alizability of the tradeoff model improved drastically, which
means that the added complexity captured more regularity than
noise. It thus seems that the time framing model was complex
enough to capture regularity and yet simple enough to preclude it
would succumb to noise (see Pitt et al., 2002).
The tradeoff model introduces a simple but significant de-
parture from discounting models: Instead of weighing outcome
by time, it weighs outcome against time. Different instantia-
tions of a single “master model” account for a wide range of
preference patterns in intertemporal choice (Read, Frederick, &
Scholten, 2012; Read & Scholten, 2012; Scholten & Read,
2010, 2012). Because outcome is weighted against time, time
has value, just as outcome does. Therefore, it is psychologically
plausible that, just as people perceive gains and losses along the
outcome attribute, they may perceive gains and losses along the
time attribute. According to the tradeoff model, they do, and,
according to the present development of the model, changes in
the timing of an outcome increase the impact of time lost, and
decrease the impact of time gained. The analogy between the
time and outcome attributes is appealing, but it is imperfect.
Outcomes carry value by themselves, time delays do not. Time
differences do carry value, just as outcome differences do, but
they only acquire value from something good or bad occurring
sooner or later. Although time is fundamentally different from
outcome, treating time as something that has value as well does
seem to improve our understanding of intertemporal choice.
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